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This paper studies the impact of financing by a particular set of Government-Sponsored Venture 
Capital (GSVC) funds, the Revitalizar VC Funds, on the performance of Portuguese SMEs 
measured by employment, sales and sales to total assets growth. Through an analysis using a 
control group of non-GSVC-backed SMEs, I conclude that in the short-term GSVC funding 
seems to hinder efficiency, does not seem to significantly relate to sales growth in high-tech 
industries and significantly relates to decreases of sales growth in low-tech industries. 
Contrastingly, GSVC-backed SMEs display a significantly higher performance in terms of 
employee growth, particularly for the high-tech industries. 
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Recently there has emerged a trend for governments to increase their involvement in venture 
capitalist activities, particularly when it comes to the funding of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs henceforth) in developed countries. This study will focus on the analysis of the 
Revitalizar Venture Capital Funds, which were created within the remit of the Portuguese 
Ministry of Economy, and whose aim is to promote the growth and expansion of Portuguese 
SMEs. These funds can be classified as Government-Sponsored Venture Capital (GSVCs 
henceforth) funds which are a type of Government Venture Capital (GVC henceforth) funds 
that are owned by the government but operated by private VC (PVC henceforth) firms, unlike 
the most common type of GVC funds, which are both owned by the government and operated 
by public VCs. GSVCs were created as an attempt to overcome management issues commonly 
affecting public organizations, such as distortions caused by the desires of interest groups to 
maximize their own private benefits, by giving their management to highly  
experienced PVCs. The total capital raised to establish these funds amounted to 220 M€, and 
they were launched in 2013, finishing their first investment cycles by the end of 2015. The 
purpose of this study is to determine the impact of financing by GSVCs on the performance of 
Portuguese SMEs measured by employment, sales and efficiency of assets growth.  
SMEs represent an important share of the Portuguese economy and foster innovation, economic 
growth, employment and the creation of value added (2016 SBA Fact Sheet: Portugal 2016). 
However, a typical problem faced by these enterprises is the lack of funding, caused by large 
asymmetric information between financiers and the SMEs. Over the last decades, venture 
capitalists have raised an interest in funding such enterprises, trying to take advantage of their 
superior capacity overcome informational asymmetry faced by traditional sources of funding 
(Amit et al., 1998). Nowadays, the supply of VC capital is vastly different from country to 
country owing to the different legal, historical and institutional contexts (Cumming et al., 2017). 
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In Portugal, venture capital, as well as other alternative financing sources, such as private equity 
and financing by business angels, are still minimal and rather underdeveloped (2016 SBA Fact 
Sheet: Portugal 2016). Nonetheless, as of 2008, the country’s business environment has 
improved considerably, and the presence of VC capital has increased. Inclusively, the 
government itself has begun to engage in the VC sector, under the GSVC financing scheme. 
Hence, determining whether this particular type of financing produces significantly better 
outcomes in terms of firm performance when compared to traditional forms of financing is a 
matter that is crucial to analyse, in order to determine whether the Portuguese government’s 
efforts on creating GSVCs had a positive impact on the financed SMEs.  
From a policy viewpoint, GVC is the most intriguing and under-researched kind of VC financier 
(Luukkonen et al., 2013). There is still much room for new research in trying to understand its 
mechanisms and consequences, particularly in Europe, where despite the high (and growing) 
number of GVCs, the existing literature on their impact on the financed companies' 
performance is very limited (Cumming et al., 2017).  
One of the main reasons why Portugal constitutes an attractive target for this study is the fact 
that its VC market is still on its early developing stage, the perfect moment to start formulating 
public policies based on the results witnessed, that could determine the future of the sector. In 
addition, most existing literature conducted on GVC-backed firms’ performance focuses on 
relatively more developed European VC markets (Alperovych et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 
2017; Grilli et al., 2014). The relevance of having literature on VC markets in distinct stages of 
development is highlighted by Brander et al. (2015), who found evidence that GVC investors 
play a greater role in earlier stages of the VC market than in more developed markets.  
Indeed, this research aims at offering an assessment on the impact of GSVCs on SME 
performance, providing empirical validation to complement the existing literature on the impact 
of this particular type of indirect intervention of governments in European VC markets, by 
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adding evidence on a relatively new and unstudied market with unique features. In other words, 
the purpose of this study is to answer the question “Does GSVC funding improve the 
performance of financed SMEs in Portugal?”. 
I find that, the GSVC funds seem to have targeted SMEs which were on average larger and less 
efficient that the average non-GSVC target. Furthermore, in the short-term, GSVC funding 
seems to hinder the efficiency of assets, measured by the sales/total assets ratio, does not seem 
to significantly relate to sales growth in high-tech industries and even appears to be linked to 
declines of sales growth it in low-tech industries. However, GSVC-backed SMEs do display a 
significantly higher performance in terms of employee growth, particularly for the high-tech 
industries. In total, the impact of the funds appears to be more related to employment rather 
than sales growth or efficiency.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the 
Portuguese SME sector and on the GSVC funds under scrutiny. Section 3 briefly examines the 
relevant literature and outlines the main research hypotheses. Section 4 includes the description 
of the methodology, followed by section 5 which introduces the data used and contains some 
descriptive statistics. Section 6 is devoted to the empirical analysis of impact of GSVC on 
SMEs’ performance. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.  
2. Background 
2.1. SME Sector Portugal 
SMEs have a big role in Portugal’s economy. In 2016, they were responsible for over two-thirds 
of total value-added, comparing to the EU mean of 57%, and almost four out of five jobs, 
comparing to the EU mean of about two out of three jobs (2016 SBA Fact Sheet: 
Portugal 2016). As of 2008, the Portuguese business setting has improved considerably. 
However, in certain aspects, such as SME’s access to finance, it continues to lag behind most 
of the EU. Despite the recent improvements on access to finance, credit is still costly and 
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challenging to access. Notwithstanding substantial government efforts to improve these aspects, 
e.g. through the creation of tax benefits for financiers and facilitating regulations, alternative 
sources of financing, such as venture capital, private equity, funding by business angels and 
crowdfunding are still negligible and rather underdeveloped (2016 SBA Fact Sheet: 
Portugal 2016). In 2015, SME productivity, measured by the value added per employee, was 
about 21,000€ per person, which is less than half the EU mean of roughly 43,000€ (2016 SBA 
Fact Sheet: Portugal 2016). Hence, there is a lot of potential to improve in the upcoming years. 
2.1. Introduction to the Revitalizar Venture Capital Funds 
This study will focus on the analysis of a specific set of GSVC funds  the Revitalizar VC 
Funds  that integrate a nationwide program called the Revitalizar Program, which comprises 
a series of distinct mechanisms that aim at stimulating economically viable enterprises.  
The purpose of the Revitalizar VC Funds is to capitalize SMEs in order to promote their growth 
and expansion, contributing to the development of new products and services, 
internationalization processes and increasing exports. In 2013, three GSVC funds were created 
according to a predetermined regional coverage. FCR Revitalizar Norte, FCR Revitalizar 
Centro, and FCR Revitalizar Sul, responsible for the regions of the North, Center and South of 
Portugal, respectively. The total capital raised to establish the funds amounted to 220 M€. Half 
of this capital was obtained through European Community’s funds and the remaining half was 
guaranteed by the main banks operating in Portugal. On the one hand, the capital raised from 
the European Community was channelled through a specific fund called FINOVA, Fundo de 
Apoio ao Financiamento à Inovação, whose financiers are specific programs that aim at 
boosting the dissemination of funding instruments that can provide better financing conditions 
to Portuguese SMEs ("FRS" 2017). Indeed, this parcel was made up by FINOVA funds derived 
from a program called COMPETE (Programa Operacional Fatores de Competitividade), 
which contributed with 90M€, as well as by two other regional programs, PORLisboa and 
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Algarve XXI, which correspond to operational programs in the regions of Lisbon and Algarve, 
respectively, which contributed with equivalent parcels of 10M€ each ("Novo Apoio Para As 
Empresas | Disponíveis 220 Milhões De Euros Para PME Nos Fundos Revitalizar" 2013). On 
the other hand, the remaining half of the capital was facilitated by seven of the largest banks 
operating in Portugal (CGD, BPI, Novo Banco, BCP, Banif, Montepio Geral and Caixa de 
Crédito Agrícola). The total capital raised was distributed among the three selected VC firms 
in order for them to establish each regional fund and manage it independently.  The final 
allocation of capital left FCR Revitalizar Norte and FCR Revitalizar Centro with equal amounts 
of 80 M€ to invest and FCR Revitalizar Sul with 60 M€. 
In order for SMEs to become beneficiary undertakings under this program, they had to respect, 
cumulatively, a set of conditions imposed by the responsible governmental entities, which 
include some significant restrictions to the PVCs’ activities, namely to the kind of activities the 
firms can undergo and the type of financing offered. In order to be eligible, SMEs had to fulfil 
the more straightforward criteria related to geographic location and being within the European 
Commission’s definition of SME which stipulates a maximum of 250 employees and 50M€ in 
annual turnover and/ or 43M€ in annual balance sheet total. Also, SMEs must have developed 
their activities in a set of predetermined sectors of activity, according to the latest Classificação 
Portuguesa das Atividades Económicas (CAE). These include Manufacturing, Energy, 
Construction, Commerce, Transportation and Logistics, and Services, although some presented 
restrictions. Firms from agriculture, coal and steel, shipbuilding, and synthetic fibers sectors, 
among others, were excluded. Furthermore, there were also some financial restrictions related 
to the SMEs’ financial health. The program excludes entities subject to a recovery order, 
following a previous decision of the Commission that declares an aid illegal and irreconcilable 
with the internal market; societies in financial difficulty, following an interpretation of the 
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European Union’s Guidelines relative to State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial 
undertakings in difficulty; or societies that are eligible to a collective insolvency process. 
As mentioned before, there are also guidelines on what type of investments the GSVCs can 
undergo. The funds have the purpose of investing their patrimony in participations of societies 
that follow projects focused on expansion, innovation and/or modernization, promoted by 
SMEs, and that conform with the demands explicit on the legal framework of the Fundo 
Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER), as well as projects in establishment or start-
up stages promoted by SMEs. The Revitalizar Venture Capital Funds shall not pursue 
investments that lay on the consolidation or financial restructuring, or the pure acquisition of 
credit, or the plain acquisition of equity stakes with no connection with investment projects by 
SMEs. Refer to Appendix 1 for the full description of the selection criteria. 
FCR Revitalizar Norte is managed by Explorer Investments, FCR Revitalizar Centro by OXY 
Capital, and FCR Revitalizar Sul by Capital Criativo, which correspond to three of the main 
VC fund managers in the country. They initiated their activities in August 2013 and finished 
their first investment cycle by the end of 2015. In other words, the period stipulated for the 
investment in new enterprises ended in 2015.  
Currently, the funds are starting their second round of financing, which adds to the significance 
of this study, once the VC fund managers can extract conclusions from the outcomes of the 
analysis performed on the previous round, and steer this second round of financing accordingly.  
3. Literature and research hypothesis 
There is a vast literature assessing the influence of VC funding on firm performance. Numerous 
firm-level studies have established that VC-backed firms grow faster (Bertoni et al. (2011); 
Davila et al. (2003)), achieve larger scale (Puri et al. (2012)), enjoy better financial and 
operating performance (Alperovych et al. (2013); Chemmanur et al. (2011); Croce et al (2013)), 
are more innovative, and are also more prone to going public than non-VC-backed firms 
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(Gompers et al., 2004). 
The VC supply also benefits the business environment as whole, by positively affecting firm 
starts, employment, aggregate income (Samila et al. (2011)), and innovation, reflected by higher 
patenting rates present in high-involvement VC markets (Kortum et al. (2000)). 
Numerous governments have tried to attain the aforementioned benefits of VC financing by 
launching their own programs, frequently using GSVC funds (Alperovych et al., 2015). 
According to Brander et al. (2015), GSVCs are typically privately-owned VC firms, which 
obtain significant funding, tax benefits, or other subsidies from the government. Therefore, the 
Revitalizar VC Funds fall within this category of funds, since the VCs responsible for the 
operationalization of the investments are precisely private firms, whereas 50% of the capital 
invested is public. Moreover, the concrete statutes and covenants applicable to all three funds 
were determined by public entities, instead of through private negotiations among contracting 
parties, as it commonly happens in the case of PVCs. Hence, this structure indicates that these 
funds enjoy public administration and private execution. On that account, and for the purpose 
of this study, the Revitalizar VC Funds will be considered GSVC funds.  
Accordingly, and considering the importance of distinguishing VC financiers according to their 
governance and ownership structures (Da Rin et al., 2011), it is crucial to analyse literature 
specifically dedicated to studying the impact of GVC financing on firm performance. 
Following the proliferation of the GVC funds across the world, a strand of literature which 
focuses on their impact when compared to non-VC or PVC financing mechanisms emerged. 
One of the first studies was conducted by Lerner (1999), who found that small firms in the US 
enjoyed substantially greater employment and sales growth post-GVC financing. Conversely, 
posterior studies argued against the positive impact of GVCs on forms’ growth performance. 
Grilli et al. (2011) concluded that pure GVC is on average found not to exercise any sizable 
influence on the growth of European SMEs, apart from the case of young enterprises in their 
NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS                                            3 January 2018 
 
 10 
initial stages. Subsequently, the authors amplified their analysis to scrutinize the impact of the 
different forms of GVC, including cases of syndication with independent VC operators, and 
beside confirming the negligibility of the impact of pure GVC financiers on growth, they found 
additional evidence corroborating the positive impact exerted by governmental funds in 
situations where governments are non-leading partners in VC syndicates (Grilli et al., 2014). 
The researchers therefore suggest that an indirect form of supporting the VC industry, for 
instance through the sponsoring of PVC initiatives rather than a direct approach, followed by 
the Portuguese Ministry of Economy in the creation of the Revitalizar VC Funds, is more 
beneficial than pure GVC structures in terms of SME growth. In this analysis, I will investigate 
whether this positive performance in terms of size growth can also be verified in the Portuguese 
market since this geography has not been included in these previous European-level studies. 
On the other hand, other metrics of firm performance, such as operating efficiency, have been 
examined.  Using a large sample of small businesses in Belgium, Alperovych et al. (2015) 
evaluated financed firms’ productivity focusing on the origin of the VC funds, comparing GVC 
versus PVC and non-VC financiers, and concluded that GVC seems to hinder the post-financing 
improvement in productivity, restricting efficiency of GVC-backed firms to levels below the 
ones of non-VC firms. This result highlights a possible drawback of this type of VC financing 
compared to traditional sources of financing, making it a crucial matter to be evaluated as well.   
This research aims at offering an assessment on the impact of GSVCs on SME performance, 
taking into consideration the different metrics used in the aforementioned literature, such 
employment, sales and efficiency growth, in a way to provide an empirical corroboration for 
this particular kind of indirect intervention of governments in European VC markets. In other 
words, the purpose is to answer the question “Does GSVC funding improve the performance 
of SMEs in Portugal?” by going through a set of sub-questions such as “Do GSVC-backed 
firms in Portugal have higher employment growth?”, “Do GSVC-backed firms in Portugal have 
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higher sales growth?”, “Are GSVC-backed firms in Portugal more efficient?” and “Does their 
performance depend on the industry context and the level of technology associated with it?”. 
4. Methodology  
In order to evaluate the impact of GSVC on the performance of SMEs, a control sample of non-
VC-backed firms was created from the total population of Portuguese firms. This control group 
was composed of all firms that, that in the year in which the Revitalizar VC funds began their 
investment cycles, were eligible to receive this type of financing but did not. This control group 
had a total of 186,986 SMEs and was created from the general population of Portuguese firms, 
by applying the restrictions of the program, described in Appendix 1. It is important to highlight 
that although certain restrictions were fully simulated, others, particularly in what the definition 
of financial difficulty is concerned, were not. The guidelines provided several methods to 
characterize financial difficulty and some could not be observed using the dataset available. 
Indeed, the program excludes entities which,  
1) were subject to an injunction of recovery, following a previous decision of the 
Commission that declares an aid illegal and incompatible with the internal market;  
2) were in financial difficulty, following an interpretation of the European Union’s 
Guidelines relative to State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings 
in difficulty (2014/C 249/01), namely: 
a. limited liability societies, when more than half of their initial share capital and more 
than a quarter of that capital has been lost in the last 12 months;  
b. or societies in each at least one of the partners has unlimited liability relative to the 
entities’ debt, when more than 50% of his/ her own funds, as indicated in the 
societies’ accounting, have disappears and more than 15% of those funds have been 
lost in the last 12 months;  
NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS                                            3 January 2018 
 
 12 
c. or societies of all types of legal natures that fill the conditions to be eligible to a 
collective insolvency process. 
From these definitions, the one relative to the losses of the firms’ initial share capital was the 
only that could be captured. Hence, the final control group was subject to a less restrictive 
definition of financial difficulty, and therefore includes a number of firms that could not have 
been eligible for funding due to their financial conditions.  
Using the control group, the approach then concentrates on comparing the performance 
evolution of both groups of firms, to determine the impact of this particular financing scheme 
on firm performance. In order to evaluate this impact, I focused on sales and employment 
growth as measures of performance as these two indicators are widely used in this strand of 
literature and have proven to highly correlate with the private firms’ valuations by venture 
capitalists (Gompers et al., 2000), adding to their alignment with performance, and 
complementing the results with a brief efficiency analysis. The methodology selected to 
perform this study was an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression framework, using the 
following model specification: 
PercentageGrowthi,2015 = α0 + α1 Ln(Size)i,2012 + α2  Pre − funding growthi,2012 +
 α3 Agei,2013 +  α4 GSVCi,2015 +  α5 Pre − funding growthi,2012  ×  GSVCi,2015 + εi,2015   (1) 
 
where PercentageGrowthi,2015 is the percentage SME growth in size between 2012 and 2015, 
Pre-funding growthi,2012 is the average yearly growth rate of the size variables between 2010 
and 2012, Ln(Size)i,2012 is the natural logarithm of the SME size in 2012 (the logarithmic 
transformation was used to reduce the impact of outliers on the regression), GSVCi,2015 is a 
dummy variable that indicates if the SME was funded by the Revitalizar VC funds, Pre-funding 
growthi,2012  GSVCi,2015  is an interaction variable between the pre-funding growth and the 
GSVC dummy and εi,t are the error terms.
 SME size is measured as the average number of 
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employees and the sales value. The interaction variable is included to understand whether 
among the GSVC funded SMEs the pre-funding growth rate helps predicting post-funding 
growth, since it seemed plausible that GSVC-backed firms behaved differently from the non-
GSVC backed ones in the relation between growth rates from pre- and post-funding periods.  
Furthermore, considering the emphasis given by the existing literature on the influence of VC 
funding on high- and low-tech industries, the previous analysis was expanded to evaluate 
patterns across industries these two types of industries. In order to determine which industries 
could be considered high- and low- tech industries, the intangible assets to total assets ratio was 
used, on the premise that firms with a higher ratio are typically more technologic than those 
with lower ratios. The methodology used followed Lerner (1999) and was applied at an 
industry-level. It consisted on calculating the median intangible assets to total assets ratios for 
each industry, using a composite sample of GSVC and non-GSVC SMEs, and classifying each 
of them as high- or low-technology industries by evaluating if their median was above or below 
the overall median value. After this division was made, the previous regression framework was 
applied, only separating these two groups of firms, hoping to shed some light on the impact of 
the industry contexts on the performance outcomes.  
5. Data and summary Statistics 
The firm-level data was retrieved from the Central Balance Sheet Database, made available by 
Banco de Portugal’s Microdata Research Laboratory. This database, provides economic and 
financial information on non-financial organisations operating in Portugal, including a vast set 
of variables, which cover from general information on the firms to cash-flow data. 
The main sample is composed by the 86 firms financed through the Revitalizar VC Funds on 
their first financing round, which began in 2013. As the analysis of the situation of these SMEs 
prior to the investment is fundamental in assessing the impact of the GSVC financing, the 
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period under analysis covers from 2010 to 2015. This time-frame enables the study of the three 
years of the undergoing investment cycle as well as the respective 3-year pre-investment period. 
Table 1 presents a broad industry distribution of the GSVC-backed and the control group SMEs 
in the sample according to the two-digit CAE – Rev.3 division level. Looking at the GSVC 
sample, the industry with the most VC-backed firms is Manufacturing, corresponding to 
46.51% of the total SMEs evaluated. There is also a considerable weight on the services sectors 
(22.09%), such as in Accommodation, Food and beverage (11.63%). Finally, Wholesale and 
retail trade also represent a significant 12.79% of the sample. At large, this scenario contrasts 
with the one of VC investments, which target heavily enterprises in less traditional sectors. 
However, these results are consistent with the investment patterns characteristic of GVC funds, 
who are known to invest predominantly in more traditional sectors like manufacturing, 
construction and HORECA (Alperovych et al., 2015). In our sample, these three sectors 
represent a total of 59.3% of the total GSVC-backed firms.  
Meanwhile, by comparing the latter with the industry distribution of the control sample, there 
seems to be an overrepresentation of the Manufacturing, Extractive and 
Information and communication industries in GSVC sample, with 46.51%, 2.33% and 9.30%, 
respectively, in comparison to their shares in the control group, 14.95%, 0.29% and 2.42%, 
respectively. Contrastingly, other areas of activity such as Wholesale and retail trade seem to 
be less favoured by the these investors, as they have less representation on the funded sample 
(12.79%) than on the control sample (34.29%).  
An intuitive interpretation for the targeting of traditional industries may be that the government 
chose to invest in firms that typically are not so prone to receiving VC funding, in order to give 
them a better chance of growth. Alternatively, this structure could have also been a produce of 
the restrictions imposed in the eligibility criteria for the target SMEs of the Revitalizar VC 
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funds’, which established strict industry coverage limitations and seems to avoid industries 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty.  
Table 1: Summary statistics of Industry distribution of VC-backed firms 
 GSVC  Control Group 
 No. firms % of total No. firms % of total 
Extractive industry (05-09)      2   2.33%      547    0.29% 
Manufacturing industry (10-33)     40  46.51%   27,964   14.96% 
Wholesale and retail trade (45-47)     11  12.79%   64,120   34.29% 
Accommodation, Food and beverage service  
Activities (55-56)  
    10 
 11.63%   20,760   11.10% 
Information and communication activities (58-63)     8  9.30%    4,531    2.42% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities (69-75)      8  9.30%   21,043   11.25% 
Administrative and support activities (77-82)      2  2.33%    7,010    3.75% 
Others      5  5.81%   41,011   21.93% 
     86  100%  186,986    100% 
Figures in parentheses are the 2-digit CAE (Classificação Portuguesa das Actividades 
Económicas) Rev.3 division codes. 
When analysing other differences between characteristics of the sample GSVC-backed firms 
under analysis and those of the control group in the pre-investments period, several interesting 
findings emerged. Table 2 presents summary statistics on the age, number of employees, total 
assets, sales turnover and sales to total assets of the two samples. Firstly, the average GSVC-
backed SME had an average tenure of 13 to 15 years at the time of the funding (2013-2015), 
while the control firms were on average 2 years older. Although this difference is significant at 
a 10% level, there seems to be no striking pattern in the VCs choosing younger firms relative 
to the SME average. This result indicates that age might not have been a determinant criterion 
in the selection of the GSVC-recipients and is also surprising, considering that GSVC targets 
are typically young firms (Grilli et al., 2014). In turn, the scale of personnel of the GSVC-
backed enterprises is consistent with literature. In 2013 the average number of employees 
working on these SMEs was approximately 46. Contrastingly, there were only roughly 7 
employees working on the firms of the control group, which constitutes a significant difference 
between the two groups. When it comes to total assets, GSVC-backed firms had approximately 
8.1M€ on average of assets while non-GSVC-backed firms present on average 0.96M€, which 
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presents a significance difference of over 7M€ between the two groups. GSVC-backed firms 
also display a significantly higher sales turnover, with an average of around 4.2M€, compared 
to an average of around 0.53M€ of non-GSVC-backed SMEs. Finally, the pre-funding 
efficiency of the GSVC-backed SMEs is lower than that of their non-GSVC-backed peers, 
measured by a significant 30.13% lower sales/total assets ratio. 
Table 2: Summary statistics pre-investment 
       GSVC backed firms Control Group Mean 
comparison  Mean SD Mean SD Difference 
Year founded 2000.25 11.75 1998.1 13.35 2.15* 
No. of employees 46.05 56.22 7.12 16.07 38.93*** 
Total assets  
(in euros) 
8,104,106 12,930,723.59 959,194.1 10,873,233.65 7,144,912*** 
Sales turnover  
(in euros) 
4,225,417 6,198,202 531,621.6 3,721,305 3,693,796*** 
Sales/total assets 
ratio 
.6279 .7528 .9291 36.97 .3013*** 
Mean and standard deviation values calculated for the year of 2012, the year before the GSVC 
funds under analysis began their investment cycle. Total asset and sales turnover values are 
expressed in euros. The test statistics presented in the last column measure whether the means 
of the GSVC sample are significantly higher than those of the control group. *** Significant at 
the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
From this analysis, GSCV-backed firms have proven to be significantly larger than their non-
GSVC peers in terms of scale, measured by total assets and average annual number of 
employees, the most widely used measures of scale in the extant literature, and also less 
efficient, measured by the sales/total assets ratio. This apparent preference for larger SMEs, 
which are not necessarily more efficient, might be a reflection of public goals aiming to increase 
the welfare of SMEs in the economy, through, for instance, job creation at a larger scale. The 
difference in scale between the two groups hinders the value of a direct comparison between 
the variables under analysis, since the differences observed can be simply related to the fact 
that GSVC-backed SMEs are larger than non-VC-backed SMEs, and not necessarily superior 
performance-wise. Therefore, a relative comparison of the financial metrics is the preferred.  
6. Empirical analysis  
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6.1. Descriptive analysis 
Panel A of table 3 shows that the mean percentage sales growth from 2012 to 2015, the funding 
period, was not significantly different between the GSVC and the non-GSVC sample, 
presenting a p-value of 0.1061 for the hypothesis that this change was greater for the GSVC 
funded firms. Panel B displays the same analysis for employment, and it can be seen that for 
the mean GSVC-backed SME there was a 96.05% increase in employment, while for the 
average firm of the control group there was only a 12% increase. This difference in means is 
statistically significant at a 1% level (p-value is .0362), which implies a significantly larger 
employment growth for GSVC-backed SMEs. In order to make sure this significant mean 
difference was not caused by outliers a test of the equality of medians was also conducted, and 
it confirmed that the medians were significantly different.  
Table 3: Growth of GSVC and non-GSVC SMEs (2012-2015) 
    
 GSVC backed 
firms 
Control Group Mean comparison 
Panel A. % change in sales    
Mean 75.9565 15.2257  
SE 46.8378 10.9746  
p-value   .1061 
No. of observations 50 109,221  
Panel B. % change in employees    
Mean .9605 .1200  
SE .4579 .0337  
p-value   .0362*** 
No. of observations 57 186,892  
The table summarizes the mean % changes in the sales and employment of the GSVC financed 
and the control of group SMEs between 2012 and 2015, and presents the results for the 
respective mean comparison tests: H0: diff = 0; H1: diff = mean (GSVC) – mean (control) > 0; 
All figures are in numeric values. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
 
6.2. Regression analysis 
Table 4 examines the growth of sales and employment in an OLS regression framework as 
described previously in Section 4. The independent variables are percentage change in these 
variables, while the independent variables were the natural logarithms of their absolute values 
in 2012, their average annual pre-funding growth (2010-2012), the GSVC dummy, an 
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interaction variable of the average annual pre-funding growth (2010-2012) for the GSVC-
backed SMEs and the age of the firms at the moment the cycle of GSVC investments began. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to analyse the efficiency of assets in a regression framework 
due to the existence of extreme outliers in the control group sample. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight that looking at the GSVC funded sample alone, there seems to be a 
reduction of efficiency after-GSVC-funding, reflected on a decrease in the sales/total assets 
ratio from .6279 in 2012, which as I’ve mentioned is significantly lower the equivalent measure 
of the control group in that same year, to .5221 in 2015. In that sense, it is important to highlight 
that (1) the GSVC selected SMEs which were less efficient than average and (2) the efficiency 
in assets, measured by the sales/total assets ratio, decreased throughout the funding period. 
For both the percentage change in sales and employment, the conclusions were in line with the 
previous mean difference tests, which indicated that there were only significant differences in 
the means of the GSVC and the control groups when it comes to employment. According to 
these regressions, the GSVC dummy was not significant for the percentage change in sales (p-
value, of .220), but significant for the percentage change in employees (p-value, of .060). These 
results show that the presence of GSVC financing had a positive relationship with employment 
growth performance, having a coefficient of around 1.05, but not with sales performance. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a significant positive relationship between the average annual 
pre-funding growth and the employment growth and a negative one between age and 
employment growth, which means that that older firms tend to present lower levels of 
employment growth, and pre-funding growth may have been a good predictor of performance 
measured by employment. However, the interaction variable is not significant for employment 
or sales, which indicates that for the GSVC funded SMEs in particular the pre-funding growth 
rate does not help predicting post-funding growth. These results are not fully aligned with 
previous studies, as the conclusions on employment growth are similar to Lerner’s (1999), but 
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results on sales growth are contrasting with those of this author and similar to those of Grilli et 
al. (2014). However, the results on efficiency seem to be consistent with those of Alperovych 
et al. (2015), who concluded that GVC seems to restrict efficiency of GVC-backed firms. 
Table 4: The impact of GSVC investments on Portuguese SMEs’ growth 
   % change in sales % change in employment 
Ln(Size in 2012) -2.6267*** (.004) -.0332*** (0.000) 
Average Annual pre-funding growth -.0000 (.161) .0129** (.036) 
GSVC 37.6660 (.220) 1.0484* (.060) 
Average Annual pre-funding growth  GSVC -.4240 (.263) -.2925 (.508) 
Age .0492 (.266) -.03031*** (.000) 
Constant 32.0069*** (.002) .1096*** (.000) 
Root MSE 140.55 1.3189 
R-squared .0015 .0021 
No. observations 89,676 157,675 
The table presents the outcomes of the regressions on the percentage change in sales and 
employment between 2012 and 2015. Due to the heteroscedasticity identified, the standard 
errors used were robust standard errors. The values in brackets correspond to the p-values 
associated with each coefficient. *** Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Additionally, I tried to identify whether there were particular industry patterns that could have 
a significant impact on the previous results. Table 5 are presents the results of the reestimated 
regressions. According to this analysis, it seems that there is no significant impact of GSVC 
funding on sales growth for high-tech SMEs in the post-funding period (GSVC dummy has a 
p-value of .238), and there is even a significant negative impact for low-tech SMEs (in this 
case, the GSVC dummy has a p-value of .036). Simultaneously, GSVC seems to have a 
significant correlation with higher percentage employee growth in both high- and low-tech 
industries. Nevertheless, the impact of GSVC seems to be higher for high-tech industries, 
measured by the coefficient of .979 compared of a coefficient of .4565 of low-tech firms.  
It is important to acknowledge that the goodness-of-fit of the regressions was unsatisfactory. 
These poor results are consistent with the those of Lerner (1999), and can be explained by the 
high level of idiosyncratic risk characteristic of small firms, whose success is often driven by 
firm-specific features that are difficult to control for in a large-sample study (Lerner, 1999).  
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Table 5: The impact of GSVC on SMEs’ growth by type of industry  
   Industry Intangible to Total Asset Ratio 
  Above median Below median 
Panel A. % change in sales  
Ln(Sales in 2012) -2.0664** (0.034) -8.2352*** (0.001) 
Average Annual pre-funding growth -.0000 (0.221) -.0012* (0.057) 
GSVC 36.0586 (0.238) -8.9685** (0.036) 
Age .0424 (0.341) .3292*** (0.005) 
Constant 25.1999** (0.026) 91.39*** (0.002) 
Root MSE 140.06 145.4 
R-squared .0009 .0135 




Panel B. % change in employees  
Ln(Employees in 2012) -.0267*** (0.000) -.0619*** (0.000) 
Average Annual pre-funding growth .0157** (0.024) -.0028 (0.843) 
GSVC .979** (0.044) .4565*** (0.000) 
Age -.0033*** (0.000) -.003*** (0.000) 
Constant .1131*** (0.000) .1066*** (0.000) 
Root MSE 1.3569 1.1624 
R-squared .0020 .0043 
No. observations 124,702 32,973 
The table presents the outcomes of the regressions on the % change in sales and employment 
between 2012 and 2015, considering a division into high and low intangible to total assets ratio. 
Due to the heteroscedasticity identified, the standard errors used were robust standard errors. 
The values in brackets correspond to the p-values associated with each coefficient. 
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
 
These results should be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the Revitalizar VC funds. 
According to their guidelines, VCs ought to concentrate in projects focused on expansion, 
innovation and/or modernization, which in most cases are not centred on short-term 
improvements but on medium-long term goals. The fact that GSVC financing seems to have no 
impact on high-tech industries and even hinder sales growth in low-tech industries (which 
constitute the majority of the SMEs financed) may indicate that through their GSVC financing, 
target firms are encouraged to focus on medium to long-term aspects rather than short-term 
sales. Additionally, on both types of firms, there seems to be significant positive link between 
GSVC financing and employee growth, which is more significant in high-tech industries. These 
results are in-line with the previous theory of the pursuance of medium to long-term strategic 
goals, in which the GSVC funds focus on helping SME develop sustainable strategies that imply 
NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS                                            3 January 2018 
 
 21 
increases in scale. However, the evidence found might in turn be a consequence of the source 
of the capital employed. Indeed, these GSVC investments were perhaps seen by the SMEs’ 
management as a sort of subsidy from the government (although it came at the expense of an 
equity stake), which might have reduced their incentives to increase efficiency within the firm 
and lead to the investment of the GSVC capital on less efficient activities, such as increasing 
scale without an underlying productivity increase goal in mind. 
7. Concluding remarks 
This study intends to offer an assessment on the performance Portuguese SMEs financed by of 
GSVC, focusing on the comparison of GSVC- vs. non-GSVC-backed firms in terms of 
employment, sales and asset efficiency measured by sales/total assets ratio. Altogether, the 
impact of the funds appears to be more related to employment rather than sales growth or 
efficiency. Indeed, I found evidence of a significantly superior SME performance at an 
employee growth level for GSVC-backed SMEs, accentuated in high-tech industries, and a 
negligible and negative performance of GSVC-backed SMEs measured by sales growth, for 
high- and low-tech industries, respectively. Moreover, GSVC financed firms also present 
reductions in their efficiency of assets during the funding period. 
The results on efficiency are consistent with those of Alperovych et al. (2015) on Belgian 
SMEs, who used a composite measure of efficiency, the global efficiency score, and also found 
evidence of efficiency decreases GVC-backed firms. The results of the studies evaluating sales 
and employment growth seem to highly depend on the geography under analysis, and my 
findings on Portugal appear to be a mix of the ones in the existing literature. The results on 
employment growth are consistent with those of Lerner (1999) and go against those of Grilli et 
al. (2014), and the inverse happens with sales growth, as Lerner (1999) found a positive impact 
of GVC funding on SMEs in the US in both sales and employment growth and Grilli et al. 
(2014) found no positive impact of such growth measures in European SMEs. 
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The stronger relationship between financing by the Revitalizar VC funds and employment 
growth might be caused by the fact that the GSVC funds are more focused on employment 
compared to PVC funds. Indeed, it is likely that this result is caused by the funds’ governmental 
nature, and therefore, in the future, the policy makers for GSVC in Portugal could consider that 
these funds focus more of their more attention on the growth of sales and efficiency, in order 
to extend the performance benefits of GSVC-backed firms from employment growth to this 
other key performance measures. 
Naturally, there are several limitations of this study, such as the inability of further restricting 
the control sample to capture more accurately the differences between GSVC and control 
samples, and the lack of data on the individual selection criteria used by the VCs to choose the 
target firms from their regional pool of applicants. It is possible that there may be a selection 
problem arising from the fact that the GSVC targeted enterprises are systematically different 
from the non-targeted ones when looking at a particular set of unobservable characteristics. If 
for instance, the managing VCs picked enterprises with superior growth projections a priori, 
conclusions regarding the benefit of GSVC financing can be deceptive.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the results of this study are still valuable for 
several entities. Firstly, they provide unique first-hand evidence on the short-term results of 
GSVC programs that can help guide GSVC fund managers in their future investment decisions 
and to improve the performance of the VC sector in Portugal. Secondly, it would help 
entrepreneurs understanding the consequences of this particular type of financing when trying 
to determine the optimal source of capital according to their goals, in order to enjoy better 
chances of achieving successful outcomes. Furthermore, it can be seen as an insightful 
contribution for academic research, as it explores a geography that hasn’t been published on 
yet, and promises to be highly relevant in the current economic context. Finally, the Portuguese 
Government could also orient upcoming public endeavours that aim to promote SME 
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development, and also stir future policy making. Ultimately, the results from this research have 
a lot of potential to be successful in achieving very concrete and applicable outcomes. 
There are many future research opportunities which can be conducted as a continuance of this 
study. Primarily, it is pertinent to analyse this exact matter is a few years, in order to continue 
to assess performance improvements over time. Methodology-wise, this analysis would 
preferably be based on a paired matching between GSVC-backed and non-GSVC-backed 
SMEs constructed on pre-funding measurements, which although not used in this study could 
provide additional interesting insights. Furthermore, as the Portuguese VC market evolves, it is 
worthy to evaluate the impact of the different types of VC, at a time where there are more VC-
backed SMEs and different program structures. 
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Content: The following appendix contains the original document with the guidelines for the 
Revitalizar Venture Capital Funds, sourced from the POFC QREN official website, which was 
on the basis of this paper. I hereby apologise for the usage of the Portuguese language. 
However, an attempt to translate the complete transcript to the English language could lead to 
deceptive interpretations of the original rulings. 
 
Reference: “FUNDOS DE CAPITAL DE RISCO REVITALIZAR - EMPRESAS 






FUNDOS DE CAPITAL DE RISCO REVITALIZAR 
 





1. São entidades beneficiárias (empresas destinatárias), as sociedades 
comerciais, de qualquer tipo (sem prejuízo de o Fundo não poder assumir a 
qualidade de sócio com responsabilidade ilimitada), que possam usufruir do 
investimento por parte dos Fundos Revitalizar no quadro do seu Regulamento 
de Gestão e demais legislação e regulamentação aplicável. 
 
2.  As empresas destinatárias devem observar, cumulativamente, as seguintes 
condições: 
(a) Localizarem-se e desenvolverem a atividade em território nacional do 
Continente de acordo com as regras de elegibilidade territorial dos PO 
financiadores do QREN; 
(b) Serem PME, condição a confirmar pela Certificação Eletrónica, emitida 
de acordo com o determinado pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 372/2007, de 6 de 
novembro, conforme alterado pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 143/2009, de 16 de 
junho; 
(c) Desenvolverem a sua atividade num dos seguintes setores de acordo 
com a Classificação Portuguesa das Atividades Económicas (CAE), 
revista pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 381/2007, de 14 de novembro: 
(i) Indústria — atividades incluídas nas divisões 05 a 33 da CAE; 
(ii) Energia — atividades incluídas na divisão 35 da CAE; 
(iii) Construção – atividades incluídas nas divisões 41 a 43 da CAE; 
(iv) Comércio — atividades incluídas nas divisões 45 a 47 da CAE; 
(v) Turismo – atividades incluídas na divisão 55, nos grupos 561, 
563, 771 e 791 e nas subclasses 77210, 90040, 91041, 91042, 
93110, 93192, 93210, 93292, 93293, 93294 e 96040 da CAE, 
estas últimas desde que declaradas de interesse para o turismo 
nos termos da legislação aplicável; 
(vi) Transportes e Logística – atividades incluídas nos grupos 493, 
494 e divisão 52 da CAE; 
(vii) Serviços – atividades incluídas nas divisões 37 a 39, 58, 59, 62, 
63, 69, 70 a 74, 77, com exclusão do grupo 771 e da subclasse 
77210 quando declarada de interesse para o turismo nos termos 
da legislação aplicável, 78, 80 a 82, 90, com exclusão da 
subclasse 90040, 91, com exclusão das subclasses 91041 e 
91042, 95, nos grupos 016, 022, 024 e 799 e na subclasse 64202. 
 
3.  Excluem-se do âmbito de aplicação do Fundo as seguintes sociedades e 
investimentos, nomeadamente: 
(a)  As sociedades sujeitas a uma injunção de recuperação, ainda 
pendente, na sequência de uma decisão anterior da Comissão Europeia 
que declare o auxílio ilegal e incompatível com o mercado comum; 
(b)  As sociedades em dificuldade, na aceção das orientações da União 
Europeia relativas a auxílios de Estado de emergência e à 
reestruturação de sociedades em dificuldade, designadamente: 
(i)  tratando-se de uma sociedade de responsabilidade limitada, 
quando se encontrar perdida mais de metade do seu capital 
social e mais de um quarto desse capital tenha sido perdido nos 
doze meses anteriores; ou 
(ii) tratando-se de uma sociedade em que pelo menos alguns sócios 
têm responsabilidade ilimitada relativamente às dívidas da 
sociedade, quando mais de 50% (cinquenta por cento) dos seus 
fundos próprios, tal como indicados na contabilidade da 
sociedade, tiver desaparecido e mais de 25% (vinte e cinco por 
cento) desses fundos tiver sido perdido nos últimos doze meses; 
ou 
(iii) relativamente a todas as formas de sociedade, a sociedade que 
preencha as condições para ser objeto de um processo coletivo 
de insolvência. 
As PME criadas há menos de três anos apenas poderão ser 
consideradas sociedades em dificuldade durante esse período 
ao abrigo da alínea (iii) acima (e não das alíneas anteriores).  
(c)  Sociedades dos setores do carvão, siderúrgico, da construção naval e 
das fibras sintéticas; 
(d)  Os investimentos diretamente orientados para o financiamento de 
atividades relacionadas com a exportação para países terceiros ou 
Estados-Membros, nomeadamente os apoios associados diretamente às 
quantidades exportadas, de criação e funcionamento de redes de 
distribuição, ou de outras despesas correntes ligadas às atividades de 
exportação; 
(e) Os investimentos condicionados à utilização de produtos nacionais em 
detrimento de produtos importados. 
 
As empresas destinatárias financiadas pelo Fundo ficarão sujeitas às condições 
de cumulação de auxílios consagradas no artigo 7.º do Regulamento Geral de 
Isenção por Categoria (RGIC), Regulamento (CE) n.º 800/2008, de 6 de agosto 
de 2008, nos termos do qual, se uma empresa destinatária receber capital 
através do investimento e solicitar subsequentemente, durante os primeiros 
três anos após o primeiro investimento de capital de risco, auxílios abrangidos 
pelo âmbito de aplicação do RGIC, os limites máximos de auxílio relevantes ou 
os montantes máximos elegíveis ao abrigo do RGIC serão reduzidos em 20% 
(vinte por cento). Esta redução não excederá o montante total de capital de 
risco recebido e não será aplicável aos auxílios estatais à investigação, 







1. O Fundo tem como finalidade investir o seu património em participações em 
sociedades de Direito português, que cumulativamente: 
(a) prossigam projetos de expansão, inovação e/ou modernização, 
promovidos por Pequenas e Médias Empresas (“PME”, na aceção da 
Recomendação n.º 2003/361/CE de 6 de maio, condição a confirmar 
por certificação da Agência para a Competitividade e Inovação, I.P., o 
“IAPMEI”), e que estejam em conformidade com as exigências 
previstas no enquadramento normativo do Fundo Europeu de 
Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER), bem como projetos em fase de 
constituição e de arranque promovidos por PME; e 
(b) sejam qualificáveis como empresas beneficiárias dos FCR Revitalizar. 
 
2. Os projetos que se candidatem a ser participados pelos FCR deverão ser 
sustentados num dossier de investimentos apresentado pelos respetivos 
promotores (as PME, seus sócios ou novos investidores na sociedade), o qual 
será analisado pela Entidade Gestora e, sempre que seja aprovado pela 
Entidade Gestora, será apreciado pelo Comité Consultivo. As propostas de 
investimento poderão igualmente ser encaminhadas para a Entidade Gestora 
pelos bancos participantes nos FCR, bem como por entidades públicas que 
tenham por missão o apoio e dinamização do tecido empresarial, em especial 
de PME. 
 
3. As decisões de investimento deverão ser tomadas com base em critérios de 
elevada diligência e competência profissional, baseando-se em planos de 
negócios economicamente viáveis para criação ou expansão de empresas 
preparados relativamente a cada entidade beneficiária, e em informações 
sobre as mesmas (nomeadamente respetivo produto e vendas), incluindo 
sempre um exercício e relatório de due diligence que poderá envolver, 
nomeadamente, aspetos de natureza económico-financeira, legal, e, se 
aplicável, tecnológica, relativamente às sociedades a analisar em termos de 
investimento do Fundo.  
 
 
4. As operações de capital de risco, poderão ser concretizadas, entre outras 
formas, através: 
(a) da aquisição, por subscrição, compra ou qualquer outra via, de 
instrumentos de capital ou quase capital; 
(b) da concessão de crédito, nos termos do Decreto-Lei n.º 375/2007, de 8 
de novembro; 
 
5. O Fundo poderá levar a cabo investimentos em parceria com outros fundos de 
capital de risco e/ou com outros investidores, incluindo com participantes do 
Fundo.  
 
6. O investimento do Fundo em cada sociedade deverá ainda observar as 
seguintes condições: 
(a) não poderá, em cada sociedade, a injeção de meios financeiros, pelo 
Fundo e por quaisquer outros instrumentos de capital de risco que se 
encontrem ao abrigo do SAFPRI, ultrapassar o valor de €1.500.000 (um 
milhão e quinhentos mil euros) por sociedade, por cada período de 
doze meses; 
(b) pelo menos 70% (setenta por cento) do investimento do Fundo na 
sociedade deverá ser realizado através de instrumentos 
representativos de capital social ou quase capital.  
Por “quase capital” entende-se: instrumentos cujo rendimento para o 
titular (investidor/mutuante) se baseia predominantemente em 
variáveis relacionadas com a geração de resultados da sociedade 
visada, que não são garantidos no caso de insolvência dessa sociedade 
e/ou que podem ser convertíveis em participações sociais ordinárias, 
desde que os mesmos (i) sejam qualificados como Capital Próprio à luz 
do Sistema de Normalização Contabilística e/ou (ii) sejam considerados 
investimento em capital de risco à luz do Decreto-Lei n.º 375/2007, de 
8 de novembro. 
 
7. Limitações ao investimento: 
(a) os FCR não realizarão investimentos que visem financiar operações de 
consolidação ou reestruturação financeira ou meras aquisições de 
créditos, nem meras aquisições de participações sociais sem ligação a 
projetos de investimento de PME; 
(b) o investimento em sociedades que já se encontrem em atividade 
poderá comportar a aquisição aos sócios dessa sociedade de 
participações sociais, de créditos ou de qualquer outro envolvimento 
financeiro, até 30% (trinta por cento) do valor do investimento total do 
Fundo, na condição de que os sócios vendedores sejam independentes 
da Entidade Gestora e dos participantes e tal aquisição seja 
indispensável à concretização do investimento; 
(c) o investimento através de sociedades-veículo, por exemplo SGPS, 
apenas poderá ser realizado desde que cumulativamente: (i) o 
interesse económico e os direitos de participação e de voto do Fundo 
sejam na substância idênticos aos que se verificariam se o 
investimento fosse realizado diretamente na sociedade de destino 
(entidade beneficiária); (ii) os fundos transferidos para a sociedade-
veículo sejam aplicados no investimento em sociedades de destino e 
em projetos de investimento que respeitem a política de investimento 
do Fundo consagrada neste Regulamento de Gestão; (iii) os fluxos 
financeiros entre as sociedades de destino do investimento, a 
sociedade-veículo e o Fundo sejam transparentes e devidamente 
documentados e justificados; e (iv) caso à data do potencial 
investimento do Fundo a sociedade-veículo apenas invista em 
entidades beneficiárias, a mesma assuma a obrigação de apenas 
investir nessas entidades durante o período de investimento do Fundo 
através da sociedade-veículo, ou caso à data do potencial investimento 
do Fundo a sociedade-veículo invista igualmente em sociedades não 
qualificadas como entidades beneficiárias, sejam contratualizados, 
mecanismos, de acordo com as melhores práticas de mercado, de 
forma a que os fluxos financeiros das sociedades de destino para a 
sociedade-veículo, sejam, na máxima medida legalmente admissível, 
segregados e transferidos, na sua quota parte, para o Fundo; 
(d) sem prejuízo de deliberação em contrário da Assembleia de 
Participantes, o FCR não investirá em sociedades em que:  
(i)  os fundos necessários (no entender da Entidade Gestora) à 
atividade da sociedade em causa tenham sido retirados pelos 
respetivos sócios, durante os doze meses anteriores à 
constituição do Fundo (através de redução de capital, 
devolução de prestações acessórias, pagamento de 
suprimentos ou por qualquer outra forma); ou 
(ii) exista algum tipo de compromisso, assumido ou renegociado 
nos doze meses anteriores à data prevista para o 
investimento, para, durante o prazo de investimento previsto, 
retirar fundos necessários (no entender da Entidade Gestora) à 
atividade da sociedade em causa pelos sócios (através de 
redução de capital, devolução de prestações acessórias, 
distribuição de dividendos, pagamento de suprimentos ou por 
qualquer outra forma); 
(e) o Fundo apenas poderá investir em valores mobiliários admitidos à 
negociação em mercado regulamentado até 50% (cinquenta por cento) 
do seu ativo total; e 
(f) o investimento numa mesma sociedade ou em sociedades que se 
encontrem em relação de domínio ou de grupo não pode, quando 
tenham decorrido mais de dois anos sobre a data desse investimento e 
até que faltem dois anos para a liquidação do Fundo, exceder 33 % 
(trinta e três por cento) do ativo do Fundo. 
 
8. Política de Desinvestimento dos FCR: 
(a) O desinvestimento deverá ser previsto, de forma clara e realista, em 
acordo com natureza de parassocial, ou outro documento que regule o 
investimento, a celebrar com os promotores e os restantes 
acionistas/sócios do investimento nas sociedades participadas e será 
efetuado através do reembolso de créditos e/ou da alienação em 
mercado, a fundos de investimento, instituições financeiras, 
promotores ou outros investidores. 
(b) A Entidade Gestora deverá assegurar que o desinvestimento ocorre 
visando sempre a maximização da rentabilidade de cada operação e 
atendendo aos melhores interesses dos participantes. 
 
